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The outcome of the European elections in Ireland reflected those across much of
Europe — losses for the traditional establishment parties, gains for populist,
Eurosceptic and anti-austerity candidates. However, in addition to the
resentment of austerity measures and democratic deficit felt across many EU
states, internal historical and political circumstances have also contributed to
these results.
Until the financial crisis of 2008, Irish voters and representatives were largely
positive about the European project. Economically, Ireland has been one of the
biggest per-capita beneficiaries of the EU, and structural funds for transport, the
Common Agricultural Policy and open trade and travel enabled the country to
become a successful, modern and open economy. Culturally and politically,
alignment with Brussels was seen by many as welcome confirmation of true
independence from London. However, a sense of unease about a loss of power to Europe has grown slowly over
the past decade — the Lisbon and Nice treaties were both initially rejected in referenda before being passed at the
second time of asking, and the austerity conditions imposed in the wake of the bank bailout in 2010 were viewed as
punitive, especially considering the relatively compliant attitude of the Irish public and politicians, compared, for
example, to those in Greece.
The only party with a tradition of Euroscepticism in Ireland is Sinn Féin, which began (as a modern party) as the
political representation of the IRA during the troubles in Northern Ireland. Currently in government with Unionists in
Belfast, the party has begun to make inroads south of the border in Dublin. Their gains came partly at the expense
of Fianna Fáil, one of two centrist parties (the other being Fine Gael) who represented opposing sides of the civil
war that followed Irish independence in 1922, and who have dominated government ever since. The other victim of
Sinn Féin’s success was Labour, a centre-left party who have suffered the same fate as many junior coalition
partners in austerity governments across Europe.
Fine Gael, the majority party in the current government, and the party of the Prime Minister Enda Kenny, saw their
support remain relatively stable. They retained four seats, despite being responsible for the implementation of
austerity measures since 2012. Fianna Fáil’s representation dropped from three seats to one (though partly as a
result of a reduction in the number of constituencies), while Labour were wiped out, losing all three representatives.
Sinn Féin, who had no representatives from the Republic of Ireland in the previous parliament, won three seats. The
remaining three seats went to independent (non-party) candidates from across the political spectrum: Luke
Flanagan, a moderate Eurosceptic who gained election to the Irish parliament on a platform of cannabis legalization
and the rights of local turf-cutters, Marian Harkin, an MEP since 2004 who focuses mainly on local community and
social issues, and Nessa Childers, a former Labour member who left the party after disagreements about its
continuing support of cuts to social services in the austerity government. The independent candidates combined
actually achieved a larger percentage of first-preference votes than any of the parties — 25.7%. Fianna Fáil and
Fine Gael both won the same percentage of votes, 22.3%, with Sinn Féin on 19.5%. Turnout was 51.6%, down 7
points from the 2009 elections, but still well above the EU-wide average of 43%.
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In
terms
of
European Party alignment, Fine Gael’s four successful candidates will sit with the EPP Group, whileSinn Féin’s
representatives and Luke Flanagan are part of the leftist GUE/NGL Group. Marian Harkin and Fianna Fáil’s Brian
Crowley sit with ALDE, and Nessa Childers remains a member Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
despite leaving the national Labour Party.
This story seems familiar: populist, localist and anti-austerity gains at the expense of mainstream centrist parties.
The difference in Ireland is that the electorate has not previously been particularly responsive to Eurosceptic or
isolationist rhetoric: there is no anti-immigration representation in Ireland, and the only party to campaign against the
Lisbon treaty, Libertas, sank without a trace after failing to win a single seat in the 2009 European parliament
elections. However, increased EU integration in the wake of the relatively unpopular Nice and Lisbon treaties was
swiftly followed by economic disaster rather than the continuing prosperity the electorate were promised, and while
the European bailout was accepted by the public — a referendum approving the EU Fiscal Compact passed with a
60% yes vote —  the perceived lack of accountability of bankers and large bondholders has weakened enthusiasm
for the EU’s economic influence.
Also, Irish internal politics is in flux: the two historically largest parties are ideologically inseparable anachronisms
from a century-old conflict, and a slow but inevitable shift to more traditional left-right alignments seems to be under
way. How this will play out is difficult to predict. The proportional representation voting system almost always leads
to a coalition government. Since the civil war of 1922 Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael have been the major government
and opposition parties, but both parties are losing the support of younger voters, and could conceivably be forced to
a centre-right coalition in the future. Sinn Féin’s platform of anti-austerity socialism makes coalition with Labour
seem possible, but their past association with violence and a lack of experience in the practical business of
governance south of the border will make it difficult for them to convince many voters (and indeed potential coalition
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partners). It will take time, but it is probably a matter of when, rather than if, this repositioning of coalitions occurs.
Fundamentally, support for the EU is sound in Ireland — a strong majority of Irish people consider themselves to be
citizens of the EU. Although damaged by the economic crisis, support should remain strong if there is a reasonable
economic recovery. The sense of democratic deficit must be addressed, although some take the attitude that nobody
in Brussels could possibly do a worse job than recent Irish governments. Indeed, punishment of the mainstream
national parties for economic mismanagement and austerity is probably single biggest factor in the Irish results —
and it is this, rather than euroscepticism, which is the most likely driving force behind Sinn Féin’s surge in support. If
the economic and political issues are managed, there will be less support for a eurosceptic message in future Irish
elections.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the Euro Crisis in the Press blog, nor of the
London School of Economics
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